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This essay traverses a heterogeneous terrain, ﬁnding important links in the ideas of Jacques Derrida 
and John Cage, and relating these to diverse cultural topics such as ﬁlm soundtrack design, audio 
art, Saussurian linguistics, the sound and light shows at the Egyptian pyramids, the analogic 
nature of digital information, and cybernetics. Furthermore, the essay attempts to create some 
bridges- through the concept of “perceptual diﬀerance”- between the divergent world pictures (to 
use Heidegger’s term) of cognitive psychology (with its quantitative frame of analysis) and the 
more slippery domain of hermeneutics.
I.  Locating Silence
The question of silence is inseparable from a certain atopia. It is no-
where to be heard, as there is no such thing as a place without sound of 
any kind. Everyone knows that outer space, to be sure, is silent, but this 
silence is only technical, and is a kind of limit-possibility, is an absolute 
in the way that death is an absolute. It is always on the other side of the 
horizon, and thus it bears within itself tropes of quests and intimations, as 
it also beckons a slew of repressions and compensations. Thus our science 
ﬁction ﬁlms always give us the roar of the rockets, the booming explosions, 
and the aﬀective omniscience of ﬁlm music—the silence of space is made 
loud and noisy, bustling with activity so unlike death. The occasional ﬁlms 
which omit sound when outside the spacecraft still have to contend with 
the candy wrappers and plastic lids and the coughing of the theatre space, 
so the silence of space can only be alluded to, barely auditioned. Perhaps the 
closest we get to the silence of space is the tinny voice of the headset, and the 
rhythm of breathing ampliﬁed in the astronaut’s helmet, the claustrophobia 
of atmospheric recirculation, such that silence is brought so close that it 
frames our perceptions and the action. Silence then takes on the explosive-
ness of an immanent possibility. Like death.
It is no accident that we bring up cosmic space in our ﬁrst consideration 
of the thematic of silence. For we can say, silence is the sound of space, quiet 
is always the sound of a place. For the closest approximation to silence is 
quiet, but to think of quiet is always to suggest a quiet: the quiet of the 
library, of a forest clearing, of anywhere at three in the morning. Silence, 
however, is a corollary of absolute space, of pure, uninterrupted extension, 
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the space of Descartes and Newton, amongst others, deplacialized space, or 
space uninﬂected, the happy medium for grids of all kinds. Noise localizes, 
for sounds have sources. They emanate from centers, or multiple centers, 
as in the accumulation of the traﬃc hum which is the acoustic signature 
of urban spaces.
Silence is as well the transposition onto the acoustic plane of the blank-
ness of paper, whether white or yellowy. Western art music shares this white 
silence with writing and painting.
Rauschenberg had presented, in the early ﬁfties, a series of monochrome 
paintings entitled the White Paintings. Here, too, the apparent empti-
ness reveals an active vitality and presence of light, color, and move-
ment. Rauschenberg’s radical move towards white paintings certainly 
drove Cage to present his own “white” work, the silent piece.
‘To Whom It May Concern: the white paintings came ﬁrst; my silent 
piece came later.’1
There is no purely and strictly phonetic writing. What is called pho-
netic writing can only function...by incorporating nonphonetic “signs” 
(punctuation, spacing, etc.).2
The imperative of silence for music, one can imagine, originates from the 
margins of the notation system, the white in-between of notes and staﬀ 
lines, as well as the silence that is reading and writing, i.e. the silence of 
speechlessness, St. Augustine’s instinctive horror at the silence of the ﬁgure 
at the lectern, the silence of unvocalized interiority, the silence necessary as 
the medium of thought.  
The superabundant display of vitality, which takes the form of knock-
ing, hammering, and tumbling things about, has proved a daily tor-
ment all my life long. There are people, it is true—nay, a great many 
people—who smile at such things, because they are not sensitive to 
noise; but they are just the very people who are not sensitive to argu-
ment, or thought, or poetry, or art, in a word, to any kind of intellec-
tual inﬂuence...On the other hand, noise is a torment to intellectual 
people. In the biographies of almost all the great writers, or wherever 
their personal utterances are recorded, I ﬁnd complaints about it; in 
the case of Kant, for instance, Goethe, Lichtenberg, Jean Paul...3
  
                                        Michael Filimowicz   27
Western art music traditionally has existed in a sort of subtractive relationship 
to the soundscape, being predicated on a certain silencing of the world. If 
this seems an overstatement, one need only look to certain recording prac-
tices for conﬁrmation. On the Telarc4 recording of Mendelsohn’s “Organ 
Symphony,” for example, the sound engineers rerouted traﬃc in a four-block 
radius around the cathedral in which the work was being recorded, in order 
to prevent acoustic contamination. Or consider the invention of the noise 
gate, created to minimize or eliminate extraneous and unwanted sounds 
in the recording space. By contrast, on many ethnographic recordings the 
sounds of insects, wildlife, weather and village life are apparent, inﬁltrating 
the music which exists in a certain additive relationship to the soundscape. 
The music is a sound amongst others.
Silence is an eﬀect, speciﬁcally, a technological and architectural eﬀect, 
a hyperquiet that perhaps can trace its lineage to the invention of masonry 
walls, i.e. walls composed of solid planes and thus impermeable to the sounds 
that might creep in through a mesh of leaves or the gaps in bundled saplings. 
Silence as a fantasy or an act of imagination will thus be linked to a certain 
stage of civilization. For we can imagine the diﬀerence between death in the 
jungle and death in the polis. In the former situation, one imagines that the 
cessation of movement on the part of the deceased may lead to a heightened 
sensitivity to the surrounding activity of the place—the animal sounds, the 
wind in the foliage; in other words, all that may have been tuned out when 
giving attention to another would uncannily return to the foreground. By 
contrast, city death implies the silence of the tomb, prepared somewhat by 
the echoey sonorousness of the temple. Thus silence can be linked to a certain 
stony sense of enclosure, interiority, and ultimately—implosion.
II.  “A” Silence 
There are no noisy tourists in Derrida’s pyramid.
...the silent writing of its a...
...the inaudible but displaced character of this literal permutation...
...this silent spelling mistake...
...it is written or read, but is not heard...
...by a silent mark, by a tacit monument, or, one might say, by a 
pyramid...
...silent, secret, and discreet, like a tomb...
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...It is a tomb that cannot even be made to resonate...
...this pyramidal silence...
...this silence that functions only within what is called phonetic writ-
ing...
...and it is itself silent...
...is inaudible.  The inaudible opens the two present phonemes to 
hearing...
...the silent token I must give...
...this unheard-of thought, this silent tracing...
...a task whose statement has remained nearly inaudible...
...in being sounded it dies away, like the writing of the a, inscribing its 
pyramid in diﬀerance...5
The silent a of diﬀerance, a grapheme without a phoneme, or writing with-
out the presence of speech to authorize it, shares a space, to be sure, with 
a certain invisibility:
It will perhaps be objected that, for the same reasons, the graphic dif-
ference itself sinks into darkness, that it never constitutes the fullness 
of a sensible term, but draws out an invisible connection6
The “matinal trace” of diﬀerence is lost in an irretrievable invisibility, 
and yet its loss is covered, preserved, regarded, and retarded.7
But this invisibility is somehow “less” than the inaudibility. For certain 
strategic reasons (i.e. the traditional privileging of speech over writing), the 
diﬀerence between “diﬀerence” and “diﬀerance,” or between presences and 
their eﬀacement, phonemes and their spacing and temporization, will be 
made a matter for silence.
A silence, however, made visible, embodied and envisaged, by the 
pyramid, the letter “A.”  For it is necessary to imagine diﬀerance, since it is 
properly neither a word nor a concept. It is approachable only by way of 
metaphor, and by a certain deafness. It would not be incorrect to character-
ize diﬀerance as an implosive potential in language. For the metaphor of 
the pyramid only works insofar as it is the interiority of the pyramid where 
the silence resides. (“Shhhh. The tour guy’s speaking.”) The trickle of stones 
down the sides and through the cracks, the attrition and gentle sandblasting 
of the hard angles, desert crickets, that fat lady who won’t stop cackling, the 
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echoes and reverberation of footsteps—these are not what Derrida’s image 
of the pyramid is meant to bring to mind. It may be objected that any op-
position between interiority and exteriority is itself a construct put to work 
by diﬀerance, but we respond that insofar as this construct may destabilize, 
the threat will be intrastructural.  
We do not have to squint too hard at Derrida’s text to note this im-
plosiveness.  
How do we conceive of the outside of a text?  How, for example, do we 
conceive of what stands opposed to the text of Western metaphysics? 
To be sure [the trace]...escapes all the determinations, all the names 
it might receive in the metaphysical text. The trace is sheltered and 
thus dissimulated in these names; it does not appear in the text as the 
trace “itself.”8
The thinking of diﬀerance prohibits a certain outside, almost as a kind of law, 
“You may not go outside.” There is nothing outside of the text, as Derrida 
has said. Or, we may write, outside. The trace is always “sheltered,” within 
the pyramid, within the silence. It is intervalic, always the “between,” spacing 
and deferring presences. The Derridean text is a kind of closed universe which 
opens inwards, towards a quasi-transcendent interiority which is neither a 
center nor an origin but which is nevertheless originary. The image of the 
pyramid guides us, but other images begin to become superimposed upon 
it: the gravity well of a black hole, or the spiral of the vortex, even a certain 
image of emanation, and perhaps of emanationism (without, of course, the 
implications of the surplus Being of negative theology, which Derrida is at 
pains to set his thinking oﬀ against, as diﬀerance relegates any “being” to 
the status of an eﬀect.). But already we are causing the image of the pyramid 
to resonate with other images, and silence does not resonate.
Or at least it is prohibited from doing so, for then it would lose some-
thing of its myth, its aura, its power of fascination, its gravity and danger. 
(“Keep your hands oﬀ- your ﬁnger oil will destroy the ruins!”)  And of course, 
we must wonder at the reiﬁcation of silence in the ﬁgure, and repetition, 
of the pyramid. 
There is of course another “outside” that is cancelled in the thinking of 
diﬀerence—the outside of language we might normally, in a move of inﬁnite 
naiveté, call the “world” as accessed through “perception”—an outside so 
banally obvious it risks being irrelevant. But nevertheless it would be the 
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outside of the “shelter” of the trace, the desert of the pyramid (lest it be a 
ﬁgure without a ground). This outside would then have to be something 
audible, and eﬀace the acoustic image of silence which has guided the thought 
of diﬀerance, the thought of the silent a: 
There will be no unique name, not even the name of Being. It must 
be conceived without nostalgia; that is, it must be conceived outside 
the myth of the purely maternal or paternal language belonging to a 
lost fatherland of thought. On the contrary, we must aﬃrm it—in 
the sense that Nietzsche brings aﬃrmation into play- with a certain 
laughter and a certain dance.9
Laughter and music (insofar as the sound of dance is music rather than heels 
clopping on the ﬂoorboards or the little shuﬄing sounds of the ballerina, 
at least until John Cage and Merce Cummingham appeared on the scene) 
appear after the long sojourn through silence that is the reading of this 
text, “Diﬀerance.” However, laughter and music are certainly within the 
realm of the audible and visible which hitherto had been perhaps relegated 
to the plane of diﬀerences rather than diﬀerance. It is as if at the threshold 
of silence one has to make some noise, as if throughout the reading of the 
text we have been holding our breath, in order not to hear it, and that now 
we must let it out, in a speciﬁcally audible aﬃrmation. Why bring out the 
noisemakers at the conclusion of an essay primarily concerned with the 
thought of silence?
We must be referred to an order, then, that resists philosophy’s founding 
opposition between the sensible and the intelligible.10  
We can of course wonder if the text has in some way sided with the intel-
ligible over and against the sensible. For it seems somewhat risky to posit 
the imperceptible (i.e. the unseen and unheard) as a strategy for negotiating 
and destabilizing the “founding opposition.” The very characterization of 
diﬀerance in terms of the inaudible and invisible puts a certain strain on the 
ears and eyes, forces a certain squinting and calls for a kind of sonar on the 
part of the reader, in order to “hear” the unheard but imagined silence at 
the heart of the tomb, while at the same time guaranteeing that the thought 
of diﬀerance remain intelligible in its exposition, with the graphic of the 
“a,” or with the parenthetical remarks “with and a” or “with an e” which are 
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given, as the essay was indeed written to be read to an audience. A text by 
Kierkegaard thematizes this phenomenon of “squinting at the text,” and we 
reproduce a part of it here in order to better grapple with this squinting.
Somewhere in Holland there lived a learned man, he was an oriental-
ist and was married. One day he did not come to the midday meal, 
although he was called. His wife waits longingly, looking at the food, 
and the longer this lasts the less she can explain his failure to appear. 
Finally she resolves to go over to his room and exhort him to come. 
There he sits alone in his work-room, there is nobody with him. He 
is absorbed in his oriental studies. I can picture it to myself.  She has 
bent over him, laid her arm about his shoulders, peered down at the 
book, thereupon looked at him and said, “Dear friend, why do you not 
come over and eat?” The learned man perhaps has hardly had time to 
take account of what was said, but looking at his wife he presumably 
replied, “Well, my girl, there can be no question of dinner, here is a 
vocalization I have never seen before. I have often seen the passage 
quoted, but never like this, and yet my edition is an excellent Dutch 
edition. Look at this dot here! It is enough to drive one mad.” I can 
imagine that his wife looked at him, half-smiling, half-deprecating 
that such a little dot should disturb the domestic order, and the report 
recounts that she replied, “Is that anything to take so much to heart? 
It is not worth wasting one’s breath on it.” No sooner said than done. 
She blows, and behold the vocalization disappears, for this remarkable 
dot was a grain of snuﬀ. Joyfully the scholar hastens to the dinner 
table, joyful at the fact that the vocalization had disappeared, more 
joyful in his wife.11
Kierkegaard’s parable throws reading back onto seeing, vocalization back 
onto breath, and dislocates the silence and solitude of reading with the 
intervention of another, the wife, who with a breath dispels the vexing dot. 
The silence of reading is eﬀaced by the smell of dinner on the table, and 
scholarly struggle eﬀaced by domestic joy. The furrow in the text mirrored 
by the furrow in the scholar’s brow materializes, becomes pervious to breath. 
The mysterious “dot” in Kierkegaard’s text bears a curious semblance to 
Derrida’s invisible “point of nonrelation,” i.e. a point to be squinted hard at, 
even in coﬀee shops, impossible to see. Derrida’s eﬀort is in part to bracket 
out “the perception of gain and the gain of perception”12 from this new 
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order, this order other than the sensible/intelligible opposition.  
But do not the senses perceive diﬀerences? Why not organize a reﬂec-
tion on diﬀerance around a meditation on the most obvious diﬀerences, 
the diﬀerences of the striations of wood on the podium at which Derrida 
speaks, for instance? What if the diﬀerential order of language were an order 
amongst other diﬀerential orders? But then this would perhaps threaten 
the “originary” status of linguistic diﬀerence. Cognitive psychologists, for 
example, speak of “just noticeable diﬀerences” in the perceptual organs, and 
attempt to quantify the diﬀerence thresholds. The point at which the ears 
detect a change in pitch, or the eyes a change in color, have the philosophi-
cally uncomfortable, or at least untrendy (to today’s audience) characteristics 
of universality, innateness, of being “hard-wired,” i.e. “outside” of cultural 
milieu, of history and tradition, of oh shall we say text. It is perhaps in this 
light that we can see Derrida’s investment in warding oﬀ perception, of 
avoiding perceptual diﬀerance.
There is of course a prejudice which holds that language alone has the 
power to make distinctions, but such a prejudice runs the risk of being very 
close to a kind of omnipotence fantasy. This prejudice is certainly prevalent 
in Saussure: 
Psychologically our thought—apart from expression in words—is only 
a vague and indistinct mass....Without language, thought is a vague, 
uncharted nebulae. There are no pre-existing ideas, and nothing is 
distinct before the appearance of language.13  
Thus without language there are no diﬀerences, just the non-image of the 
nebulous or amorphous (which is still an image!). Of course, anyone who 
has ever wondered at the exquisite sensitivities and intricate structures of 
our perceptual organs would ﬁnd it diﬃcult to grant language all powers of 
distinction that be. Else how could the grizzly bear discern the ﬁsh beneath 
the frothing brook, or the eagle single out the tawny rabbit darting amongst 
the undergrowth?
We start with the elementary concept that each living organism is 
continuously engaged in interchange with its environment....The com-
position of the immediate environment cannot therefore be regarded as 
unchanging.  Consequently it may become important to the survival 
of an organism that it should detect and respond to certain crucial 
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aspects of environmental change....
The function of each particular sense organ is to focus upon one 
speciﬁc feature of environmental change and to signal the current value 
of the intensity of that change.14
Thus it is claimed that the sense organs are responsive primarily to changes, 
i.e. diﬀerences, rather than discreet presences. It is not as simple as all becom-
ing an indistinct mass without the discerning power of language.
Thus Derrida will have to takes pains to route the body from any claim 
on diﬀerance which may threaten what one might call the hegemony of 
linguistic diﬀerance.  
...[C]ould we not, quite simply and without any neographism, call it 
diﬀerentiation? Among other confusions, such a word would suggest 
some organic unity, some primordial and homogenous unity, that 
would come to be divided up and take on diﬀerence as an event.15
A certain impoverishment is imputed to discourses of the “organic.” An 
inadequacy towards the multifarious and heterogeneous, as well as a certain 
nostalgia for the undiﬀerentiated, is ascribed to what necessarily intersects 
a multitude of discourses, from zoology to biochemistry to bioacoustics to 
micro physiology to ethology to psychoacoustics to plain old high school 
biology.  At a time when bodies have come to be seen as “a complex ecology 
of subsystems,” “corporate entities of...cellular communities,”16 i.e. when 
precisely the text of the organic is not dominated by a worn-out aesthetic 
principle but is rather composed of a host of discourses which may at any 
point intervene, take on relevance, even contaminate post-Saussurian lin-
guistic discourses (i.e. the aforementioned bioacoustics and psychoacoustics), 
it seems to be a strange move on Derrida’s part to at one stroke eliminate 
perception with an impossible, barely imaginable, imperception. It is as 
though silence and the invisible had to be invented because they are the 
imperceptible as such. Moreover, the emphasis on the silence rather than the 
invisibility of diﬀerance seems necessary precisely because on the visual-spa-
tial plane there is no “in between” of diﬀerences— there are just diﬀerences, 
two colors side by side, for instance—whereas the acoustic plane is temporal, 
and the intervals between sounds can be conceived as silence, as the absence 
of perception. But as John Cage discovered, this too is a ﬁction.   
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There is no such thing as an empty space or an empty time. There is 
always something to see, something to hear. In fact, try as we might 
to make a silence, we cannot. For certain engineering purposes, it is 
desirable to have as silent a situation as possible. Such a room is called 
an anechoic chamber, its six walls made of special materials, a room 
without echoes. I entered one at Harvard University several years ago 
and heard two sounds, one high and one low. When I described them 
to the engineer in charge, he informed me that the high one was my 
nervous system in operation, the low one my blood in circulation. 
Until I die there will be sounds. And they will continue following my 
death. One need not fear about the future of music.17
Derrida’s pyramid is Cage’s anechoic chamber. At least up to the point when 
Cage entered. Then, at the exact moment when silence would have been 
heard, and culminated itself as a place, the pyramid vanishes and what might 
have been an intimation of death becomes a soundscape of life. It may be 
that the anechoic chamber is in a sense the vestibule of Derrida’s pyramid, 
for the pyramid will of course be on the other side of mortality, ﬁnitude, 
of all that is delimited. This vestibule anticipates silence, prompts mortal 
reﬂections, “Until I die there will be sounds.” Until.... Death deferred, 
the anechoic chamber postpones and displaces even the pyramid. Like 
the pyramid, and the space shuttle which attains the proximity of silence, 
and even like the technical language which is philosophical discourse, the 
anechoic chamber is a highly engineered situation. It is a giant astronaut’s 
helmet, throwing perception back onto the body’s irreducibility. And yet 
the technics necessary to silence contradicts precisely and paradoxically the 
entropic character of death. It is as if absolute silence shared conceptual 
space with technics as well as death. The diﬀerent registers of the nervous 
and circulatory systems resounding on the threshold of silence function 
in an analogous manner to the noise of aﬃrmation which culminates and 
usurps Derrida’s metaphor of the tomb.
To amalgamate J.D. with J.C., there is always already noise.   
Amongst the most interesting discoveries of bioacoustics is the phe-
nomenon of ecosystemic vocal diﬀerentiation. In other words, it is found 
that, within a given ecosystem, the frequency bands of the acoustic spectrum 
will be divided up amongst the inhabitant species, such that those bands 
of frequencies primary to vocalization will overlap only at the extremities, 
while species within a given ecosystem that share a common bandwidth of 
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vocalization will be temporally diﬀerentiated into nocturnal and diurnal 
orientations, so as not to jam each others’ signals. Thus the soundscape is a 
kind of radio dial wherein each species has been allotted a bandwidth. Not 
by some kind of trans-species FCC, i.e. some Authorial Being, to be sure 
(such a being would already have its bandwidth allotted to it by a diﬀerence 
which would exceed it), but, undeniably, out of a diﬀerance in the general 
economy to which each species’ communicative wavelengths would be as 
restricted economies. And it is no diﬀerent for human speech, which has its 
range that overlaps and is delimited by the vocalities of other beings.  
Between the phonemes there is not silence, but rather the noise of the 
world, the spacing and placing within an interval, it should go without 
saying, that has little to do with silence. There is room for us and others to 
communicate. Language is a sound amongst sounds, perhaps even a language 
amongst languages. It is a clearing in the ﬁeld of noise, though permeated 
by it, sensibility within an excess of signal.  
III.  Vanishing Silence
A certain outward move is required, an ecstatic opening in the text to 
counter its implosive tendencies, its tilt toward the silences and violences 
of primal repressions, “the death of the king,”18 the tilt towards the always-
sheltered, quasi-noumenal meta-traumatics of “primordial diﬀerance.”19 We 
can trace such an ecstatic condition in certain ecological discourses which 
destabilize language as the property, or what is proper, to homo antrhopo-
centricus, and dislocate the specism constitutive of logocentrism. One trace 
of this destabilization can be sought out in theories of the paralinguistic and 
preverbal, and the relationship of human language, thought of as digital, 
to analogic animal communication systems. This distinction of digital and 
analog does not bear the structure of an opposition or dialectic, but rather 
resembles the distinction of diﬀerence and diﬀerance, insofar as its structure 
is that the latter underlies, sustains and produces the former.     
How does it happen that the paralinguistics and kinesics of men from 
strange cultures, and even the paralinguistics of other terrestrial mam-
mals, are at least partly intelligible to us, whereas the verbal languages 
of men from strange cultures seem to be totally opaque?....
Verbal language is almost (but not quite) purely digital. The 
word “big” is not bigger than the word “little”; and in general there is 
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nothing in the pattern (i.e. the system of interrelated magnitudes) in 
the word “table” which would correspond to the system of interrelated 
magnitudes in the object denoted. On the other hand, in kinesic and 
paralinguistic communication, the magnitude of the gesture, the loud-
ness of the voice, the length of the pause, the tension of the muscle, 
and so forth—these magnitudes commonly correspond (directly or 
inversely) to magnitudes in the relationship that is the subject of the 
discourse.20
Thus language, we might say, resonates with nonlanguage, or not-quite-
language, takes on perceptual magnitudes, is contaminated with the foreign 
bodies and the animal like-language which we ascribe to those bodies, “com-
munication systems” or “signaling” patterns. The silence of the trace can only 
have meant the silencing of the animal in the voice, even the silencing of the 
tree in the paper, and the petroleum biomatter or squidean vicissitudes of 
ink. The imperceptibility of the order of diﬀerance seems to have attempted 
to obscure a certain bewildering profusion of signiﬁcation. As a comment 
to the Kabbalah reads, “Do not think of it as ink on paper. Think of it as 
black ﬁre on white ﬁre.”21 To recognize this is only to call attention to the 
noise ﬂoor of language, which at the same time introduces an inescapable 
ecstatic horizon to the text.
The unit of survival is a ﬂexible organism-in-its-environment.22
The individual mind is imminent not only in the body.  It is imminent 
also in pathways and messages outside the body; and there is a larger 
Mind of which the individual mind is only a subsystem....     
     Freudian psychology expanded the concept of mind inwards to 
include the whole communication system within the body—the au-
tonomic, the habitual, and the vast range of unconscious processes. 
What I am saying expands mind outwards. And both of these changes 
reduce the scope of the conscious self. A certain humility becomes ap-
propriate, tempered by the dignity or joy of being part of something 
much bigger.23
     
David Dunn, a sound artist and theorist, has built upon this image of 
ecological communication to propose an interface for questions relating 
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music to language.  In his thinking, music functions as “creative dissocia-
tion,”24 a vital play of sound which “demilitarizes”25 language.   He writes 
of the “interactive imperative,”26 the necessity of thwarting the closure of 
the digital realm:     
If an individual species developed suﬃcient self-referential complexity 
(i.e., the cognitive domain of the conscious human mind) to escape the 
“orbital inﬂuence” of the larger mental structure within which it was 
resident, conﬂict might arise. Unless balanced patterns of interaction are 
retained that allow for “linkup” between individualized consciousness 
and the ecosystemic mind, the individualized mind could forget itself 
as a component and begin to behaviorally subvert the larger structure. 
Such a separate mental system might, however, retain elements sus-
ceptible to inﬂuence from the ecosystemic structure and continue to 
exhibit behavior reminiscent of its more archaic function as a mental 
component.27
It would be the task of music, then, to activate this “archaic function,” to 
keep operative  the forgotten and repressed linkage to sounds-at-large.  
As an escape valve [music] has channeled the overﬂow of our body 
expressivity into a communicative act, which allows other levels of the 
mental structure to be resonated. Musicians have generated interactive 
mental structures analogous to the now truncated ecosystemic mind 
which may also fulﬁll a similar function within the deep structure of 
our individual physiologies.28  
    
Despite our CDs and DVDs there is, properly speaking, no such thing as 
digital sound. The closure of the binary apparatus is eﬀected by a double 
opening, analog-to-digital converters on the input side, digital-to-analog 
converters on the output side. The opaque, quietly humming box of the 
computer at the heart of a digital audio workstation is an ecstatic image of 
language, an image of the digital as analogic detour. The digital of writing’s 
black and white, or speech’s vocalizing and pausing, takes on the analogic 
vertigo of something we perceive. It is an inverted Derridean pyramid—it 
lights up and hum—and quietly so, unlike like the sound and light shows 
one ﬁnds at the actual pyramids, i.e. a fervent repression of silence and 
death, of the quiet one might like to ﬁnd there.
38  Janus Head
We can answer that famous smart alec question posed by some sleepy, 
semiotic student: “Uh, what about onomatopoeia, Dr. Saussure? Isn’t that, 
like, nonarbitrary? Isn’t that kinda sorta like language glued to perception?” 
Onomatopoeia, like signaling “hunger” with your hand on your belly, is ana-
log communication. The various ways of saying that you are hungry, in the 
world’s cornucopia of lingoes, is digital stuﬀ. There is no formal opposition, 
no privilege to get uptight about, because even digital signs have to be seen or 
heard. And once perceived, we imagine it digitally in our heads, or wherever 
our culture tells us the seat of thought happens to reside that day.
We should, ﬁnally, touch upon the characterization of diﬀerance which 
we have as yet neglected, namely, the image of play. It is pertinent to recall 
play precisely at the moment we have been thinking of music. For play is 
of course the source of the hubbub of dancing and laughing which aﬃrmed 
the silence of the text.
With its a, diﬀerance more properly refers to what in classical language 
would be called the origin or production of diﬀerences and the diﬀer-
ences between diﬀerences, the play of diﬀerences.29
We are here to think of play as an originary element, thrust out of its dif-
ference and opposition to work, though one could say that the work of 
diﬀerance is diﬀerence, insofar as diﬀerences are said to be produced. Play, 
one might say, unlike work, produces nothing, or simply produces itself.
Obviously the non-rigidiﬁed mental play of children forms an im-
portant part of their language acquisition skills and may have always 
played a major role in the evolution of language throughout human 
history.30
More speciﬁcally the incomprehensibility of later twentieth-century art 
to which I refer has much to do with its syntactically assumed/speech-
modulated language constructs.31 
We have allowed the thought of play to lead us, quite naturally, to the 
thought of children, to thoughts on acquisition of syntax, and to thoughts 
about work, i.e. production. Of course, the play of children, like the work of 
adults, is often noisy, though to attend to these diﬀerences, these oppositions 
constructing themselves so quickly, almost, so silently, we require a certain 
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quiet  place to think them. It thus seems appropriate to end with such a quiet 
place, a beach, for instance, as opposed to the rambunctious noisy silence 
of outer space where we began this essay. We might end, perhaps, with an 
insuperable poem, of play and work, laughter and ocean waves, children 
and men, by the Bengali poet Rabindranath Tagore.32 
On the seashore of endless worlds children meet.  The inﬁnite sky is motionless 
overhead and the restless water is boisterous.  On the seashore of endless worlds 
the children meet with shouts and dances.
They build their houses with sand and they play with empty shells.  With withered 
leaves they weave their boats and smilingly ﬂoat them on the vast deep.  Children 
have their play on the seashore of worlds.
They know not how to swim, they know not how to cast nets.  Pearl ﬁshers 
dive for pearls, merchants sail in their ships, while children gather pebbles and 
scatter them again.  They seek not for hidden treasures, they know not how to 
cast nets.
The sea surges up with laughter and pale gleams the smile of the sea beach. 
Death-dealing waves sing meaningless ballads to the children, even like a mother 
while rocking her baby’s cradle.  The sea plays with children, and pale gleams 
the smile of the sea beach.
On the seashore of endless worlds children meet.  Tempest roams in the pathless 
sky, ships get wrecked in the trackless water, death is abroad and children play. 
On the seashore of endless worlds is the great meeting of children.
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